04/26/01
PL SC 14H
Terrorism and the International Court of Justice
I.History of International Terrorism
II.State Sponsored Terrorism
A.Iran
B.Sudan
III. Benefits Derived From Terrorism
A.Inexpensive and ability to advance ideologies
B.Fear
C.Publicity
D.Minimal risk
E.Lack of public defeat
IV.Aspects of Terrorism
A.Technological advances
B.Weapons of mass destruction
C.Cyber terrorism
D.Suicide bombing
V.Islamic Terrorist Organizations
A.Islamic Jihad
B.Al-Gama’a ai-Islamiyyah
C.Hamas
D.Hizballah
E.Usamah Bin Laden
1.Status of Bin-Laden
2. Applicability of International Law
a. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons
b. International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings
c. Organization of the Islamic Conference
3. International Court of Justice Ruling
4. Discussion of Ruling and Questions
a. Were all other options considered before imposing
sanctions?
b. Who has jurisdiction over Usamah Bin Laden?
c. Should Bin Laden be extradited?
d. Is it legal to impose sanctions on the Taliban?
VI.United States’ Terrorism Policy
A.Make no deals
B.Must be held accountable in a court of law
C.Isolate and apply pressure to states that sponsor terrorism
VII. Conclusion
International terrorism has changed in structure and design over the
centuries. Jewish zealots conducted campaigns against the Romans in the
first century AD, and the Hashshashin, a Shi’ah Muslim group who gave us
the word assassin, systematically murdered thoseinpositionsand
leadership during the 19th century (CSIS 1999: NP).The modern age of
terrorism began in the 1960’s. International terrorism in its current form
began in 1968. As the 1970’s passed by, the explosion of extremist groups
and related incidents sparked a new awareness of the dangers of terrorism.

In the 1980’s, Canada was the victim of several terrorist attacks carried
out by Armenian and Sikh extremists, including a bombing of an Air India
flight originating in Toronto, which exploded off the coast of Ireland,
killing 329 people (CSIS 1999: NP).

The 1995 Sarin gas attack by the Aum Shinrikyo Cult in a Tokyo subway
marked a new threshold in international terrorism. For the first time,
people began to realize that similar groups could use weapons of mass
destruction or plan attacks to inflict maximum casualties. The long-term
effects of exposure are yet to be determined, but preliminary tests of
eighteen victims conducted in January 1998 showed that their sense of
balance was affected by the nerve gas (ACOEM 1998: NP).

Terrorism, as defined by Title 22 of the United States code, section
2656f(d), is the “pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience.” Islamic terrorism is a serious
problem for the United States because of the threat to national security,
innocent civilians, and the foundations of democratic societies throughout
the world (1997 Global Terrorism: NP).

Most of the Islamic world perceives the West, especially the United
States, as the foremost corrupting influence on the Islamic world today.

The Hizballah, an Iranian terrorist group, have labeled the United States
as “the Great Satan” (Sinha. “Pakistan-The Chief Patron-Promoter of Islamic
Militancy and Terrorism”: NP). This growing animosity that Islamic nations
feel toward the Western world has been continually demonstrated by the
increase in international terrorism. However, Muslims view their actions
as acts of self-defense and religious duty and not as terrorism. The
Islamic radical movements main success has been their ability to gain
legitimacy from the general public (Paz 1998: NP). During the past two
decades, they have had enormous success with their ability to present
themselves to the Arab and Muslim world as the true bearers of Islam.

They appeal to the lower class due to the shared resentment of wealthy
westerners while the middle class and intellectuals are drawn toward these
radical groups in order to expel imported ideologies and forms of
government (State Department. “Anti-US Attacks” 1997: NP). Radical Islamic
organizations have declared a holy war, Jihad, in order to bring the Arab
world together and take their place as a world power. In order to
accomplish these goals, Islamic radicals have mainly used terrorism as
their main instrument of persuasion.

The largest and most active terrorist organizations are those which
are state funded. These organizations act as both an overt and covert way
of spreading the sponsor countries ideologies. The U.S. Secretary of State
has designated seven governments as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (State Department. “Over
of State-Sponsored Terrrorism” 1997: NP). These governments support
international terrorism either by engaging in terrorist activity themselves
or by providing arms, training, safe haven, diplomatic facilities,
financial backing, logistic and/or support to terrorists (“Over of State-
Sponsored Terrorism” 1997: NP).

Iran is one of the most active state sponsors of terrorism, involving
themselves in the planning and execution of terrorist acts by its own
agents and by surrogates such as the Hizballah. Tehran conducted 13
assassinations in 1997, the majority of which were carried out in northern
Iraq against the regime’s main opposition groups. In January of 1997,
Iranian agents tried to attack the Baghdad headquarters of Mujahedin-e
Khalq using a supermortar. However, despite sanctions and foreign
political pressure, Iran continues to provide support in the form of
training, money, and weapons to a variety of terrorist groups, such as
Hizballah, HAMAS, and the PIJ (State Department “Over of State-Sponsored
Terrorism” 1997:NP).

Sudan is another large supporter of terrorist organizations. The
Sudanese Government supports terrorists by providing paramilitary training,
indoctrinization, money, travel documents, safe passage, and refuge. They
also condone many of the objectionable activities of Iran, such as
funneling assistance to terrorist and radical Islamic groups operating in
and transiting through Sudan. Since Sudan was placed on the United States’
list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993, the Sudanese Government still
harbors members of the most violent international terrorists and radical
Islamic groups (State Department “Over of State-Sponsored Terrorism” 1997:
NP).

Middle-Eastern countries have found terrorism beneficial for many
reasons. First, terrorism is an inexpensive alternative to fighting a war,
while still spreading their ideology and advancing their political agenda.

Alternately, defending against terrorism is very expensive; the United
States spends approximately five billion dollars annually to guard against
terrorism (Wilcox 1996: NP). Even though terrorism kills relatively few
people, the random nature by which innocent civilian are killed evokes a
deep fear and insecurity upon the population. This form of terrorism was
successfully used to target tourism and damage Egypt’s economy in 1997.

Publicity is another benefit of terrorism. By involving acts which are
designed to attract maximum publicity, terrorism can bring the smallest
group to the forefront of attention (Rajeswari: NP). All of this is done
while exposing the terrorist to minimal risk when compared to war.

By secretly funding terrorist organization, the patron state avoids
the possibility of defeat and does not appear to be the aggressor. Modern
technology has now made terrorism an efficient, convenient, and discrete
weapon for attacking state interests in the international realm.

Furthermore, the fear evoked by terrorism creates an ideal setting to
launch propaganda, which enables patron states to organize revolts, coups,
and even civil war (Rajeswari: NP).

History shows that terrorism has only been successful in prolonging
conflicts, as in Ireland. However, technology is constantly changing the
nature of life-threatening hostilities by delivering more sophisticated
devices that cause greater damage. No longer are terrorists restrained to
simple car bombs and explosives; now nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons are becoming more readily available. The terrorist attack in Tokyo
that injured 5,000 people is an example of this kind of terrorism. The
latest threat is the cyber terrorist, who can corrupt a governments
computer system, steal money, and/or classified information while never
leaving his house. Changing methods and techniques that terrorists employ
today make threat of attack worse than ever. First, terrorists operate at
an international level, no longer concentrating on a particular region or a
country. The dawn of the modern age of terrorism dates back to September 5,
1972, when the Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic team in
Munich. Following this, there has been a period of hijacking of commercial
airlines, which culminated in the destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland (Rajeswari: NP).

Another new aspect of terrorism is the growing possibility of
terrorists making use of weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, biological
and chemical. Also, the governments have to think seriously about the
threat of chemical weapons and biological toxins. Both these types of
weapons are easy to manufacture but have horrifying after-effects on the
civilian population. The Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by
Aum Shinrikyo showed that the threat of chemical terrorism is now a reality
(Sinha “Threat of Islamic Terrorism”: NP).

For many years, it had been thought that weapons of mass destruction
did not serve the purpose of terrorists, and it was not mass murder they
wanted. But in the modern age of terrorism, one sees a wider use of
powerful explosives that attack mostly the civilian population, and
availability is the only thing that prevents the use of larger weapons.

This trend towards larger attacks is represented by a 25-year low in
international terrorism in 1996, with reported incidents down from a peak
of 665 in 1987 to 296 in 1996. At the same time, the number of casualties
rose dramatically (1997 Global Terrorism: NP).

The third aspect of terrorism that is new is cyber terror. It has
become very easy to penetrate the telecommunications and computer systems
of nations as well as private organizations, and enter new computer codes
that cause the system to shutdown or to make it accessible only to the
intruder. Terrorists use computers, cellular phones, and encryption
software to evade detection and they also have sophisticated means of
forging passports and valuable documents. Similarly, they could even
introduce “morphed” images and messages into a country’s radio and
television network, and spread lies that could incite violence. Technology
advancement has made it possible to carry powerful explosive devices in a
purse and explode these at the right place and at the right time (Sinha
“Threat of Islamic Terrorism: NP).

Another recent trend in terrorism is suicide bombing. Suicide
bombings have emerged as a tactic used particularly by radical Islamic
terrorists. Even though Islam prohibits suicide, these suicide bombers
believe that death in a holy struggle assures them a faithful place in
heaven; thus, by committing this act of war, they feel they are guaranteed
to go to heaven. This method of terrorism is almost impossible to defend
against and the reason why terrorists must be prevented, not only deterred
(Sinha “Threat of Islamic Terrorism: NP).

Many radical Islamic terrorist organizations have developed in recent
years, but the biggest organizations are the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al-
Gama’a ai-Islamiyyah, and the Hizballah. These organizations all seek the
elimination of western and Jewish influence, and will not hesitate to go to
any length to prevent foreign influence (State Department “Armed Islamic
Group, IG: NP).

The Islamic Jihad Group , in Egypt, has been active since the late
70’s, and currently includes two factions. The goal of these factions is
to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state.

To accomplish this, the Jihad operates in small underground cells and
attacks elite government officials. Their most notorious acts of terrorism
have been the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat and the 1993
attempted assassination of Prime Minister Atef Sedky (Jihad Group:NP).

Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah, The Islamic Group, or IG, evolved from a
group of Islamic prisoners in Egypt. After being released from prison in
1971, they began forming militant groups that operated separately but were
loosely organized. These groups target police officers, liberal
intellectuals, Coptic Christians, and tourism in order to hurt the economy
and rid Egypt of Western influence. The IG’s most recent attack was
November 17, 1997, when 58 tourists were killed; this severely impacted
Egyptian tourism for several months (The Islamic Group: NP).

Hamas is the Arab acronym for, “The Islamic Resistance Movement,” and
means courage and bravery (Al-Islamiyya: NP). This organization has
evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood and was active in the early stages of
Intifada, operating in the Gaza strip and the West bank. The main
objective of the Hamas is a “Holy War” for the liberation of Palestine and
the establishment of an Islamic Palestine. A variety of non-governmental
charitable organizations in the Gulf States, four central charity funds
throughout the world, and Iran have enabled Hamas to become the second most
powerful terrorist organization. During Intifada, Hamas claimed
responsibility for 43 attacks that killed 46 Palestinians, and is believed
to be responsible for another 40 deaths (Al-Islamiyya: NP).

Hizballah, meaning party of God, is an extremist political-religious
movement based in Lebanon. The movement was created and sponsored by Iran
in July 1982, initially as a form of resistance to the Israeli presence in
Southern Lebanon. Hizballah followers are radical Shi’ite which adhere to
Khomeinistic ideology. The principle goals established by Khomeinism are
the equality of all Lebanon’s citizens, complete American and French
withdrawal from Lebanon, the complete destruction of Israel, and the
establishment of Islamic rule over Jerusalem. The Hizballah has tried to
accomplish these goals through the use of terrorism, of which 704 attacks
were committed from 1991 – 1995 (Information Division: NP). The scope and
nature of Hizballah’s terrorist campaign reflect its close dependency on
Iranian support for both the ideological and financial levers. Iran
donates vast amounts of money to Hizballah, which among other things funds
the movement’s health and education services.The funds received from Iran
in the 1980’s totaled $60-$80 million a year (Rajeswari: NP).

Throughout researching these groups, once case involving a Saudi
Arabian National, Usamah Bin Laden, exemplifies the difficulties with
prosecuting terrorists in the International Court of Justice. Whether
domestic or international in nature, terrorism is having an ever-increasing
impact upon the international community. The United States has fallen
victim to acts of terrorism recently, most notably the 1995 bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, and the 1998
bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Upon investigation, it
was revealed that the embassy bombings were linked to Usamah Bin Laden, a
former Saudi Arabian National whose excessive bank accounts fund a
worldwide terrorist operation.

Further investigation revealed that Bin Laden was living in
Afghanistan in a camp protected by his own 200-man private army and a sub-
unit of the Taliban, a quasi-religious organization operating within
Afghanistan’s borders (MSNBC 1999: NP). The United States, backed by other
nations who have had terrorist attacks related to Bin Laden, appealed to
the United Nations Security Council to call for the extradition of Usamah
Bin Laden for trial.

In response to the request, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted resolution 1267 on October 15, 1999. The resolution
called for sanctions to be placed on Afghanistan unless the Taliban turned
over suspected terrorist Usamah Bin Laden to the appropriate authorities.

Bin Laden is currently a suspect in financing terrorist activities in
nation-states such as Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Kenya, and the United
States of America. Worldwide intelligence networks have been attempting to
maintain constant surveillance of him in order to help deter further acts.

However, he is still free, protected by the Taliban, who share many of the
same fundamentalist beliefs with him (MSNBC 1999: NP).

International Law has established several procedures for the
extradition and trial of international terrorists. Currently, there are
eleven documents of international law, which address the issue states’
responsibility for combating terrorism (USIA, Feb. 1999). Bearing in mind
the precedence established in international law as well as the nature of
these activities that have been associated with Usamah Bin Laden, it is
appropriate to impose sanctions upon the Taliban for the surrender of
Usamah Bin Laden to the proper authorities.

At present, Bin Laden controls a comprehensive international
terrorist network, all financed through Bin Laden’s personal fortune. His
headquarters are located in Afghanistan, and are protected by numerous
Taliban soldiers. While tensions between Bin Laden and Taliban members have
become strained since August 1998, he nonetheless has remained free from
capture to this point. However, Security Council Resolution 1267 does
indeed call for Afghanistan to turn him over to the proper international
authorities (ERRI 1998: NP).

Bin Laden is officially a man without a country, as Saudi Arabia
pulled his passport in 1994 amidst allegations of financing subversive
activities in Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen. Bin Laden fled to Sudan, where he
began working with the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan al-
Turabi. While in the Sudan, he financed three terrorist training camps in
cooperation with the NIF (ERRI 1998: NP). After May 1996, his exact
whereabouts have been unknown, with rumors placing him in places such as
Yemen, in Saudi Arabia with a false passport, even captured by the
Afghanistan government. Bin Laden called for a Holy War against U.S.

Forces in April 1996, February 1997, and February 1998. He is currently
suspected in acts including the World Trade Center bombing, a Saudi Arabian
National Guard base in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania (MSNBC 1999: NP).

Current international law, even precedence established by this very
court, indicates that the process of bringing Usamah Bin Laden to trial is
legal. Numerous conventions and treaties support this action, both
globally and regionally as well. The first convention that applies is the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, brought
into effect on February 20, 1977, with 26 signatories and 126 parties to
it. This convention can be applied specifically to the 1998 bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Article I of the Convention defines “internationally protected
persons” as “any representative or official of a State or any official or
other agent of an international organization of an intergovernmental
character who, at the time when and in the place where a crime against him,
his official premises, his private accommodation or his means of transport
is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to special
protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as well as
members of his family forming part of his household.” Bearing in mind the
fact that these bombings did occur at official buildings, these acts fall
under this convention. Article 7 further states that the nation-state
which houses the alleged offender shall either extradite him for trial or
hold a trial on their own soil. This treaty lays out the definition of
“protected persons” and establishes a code of conduct for bringing such
criminals to trial.

The next convention that holds precedence in this situation is that
of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

The convention provides for one exemption: if the alleged act occurs within
a state in which the offender and the victims both reside and the alleged
offender is still in the state. For example, the bombing of the U.S.

Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma is an example of an act that is
exempt from the provisions of the convention. However, Usamah Bin Laden
does not fall under this exemption. Therefore, the Articles of the
Convention directly apply to the situation at hand. Furthermore, Article 9
supplements Article 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents. Bearing in mind that both of the conventions are entered into
force, nation-states are to be held accountable to them, including
Afghanistan (United Nations International Convention for Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings 1997: NP).

Finally, the Convention on the Organization of the Islamic Conference
on Combating International Terrorism, ratified in Tehran in December 1997
at a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, can be directly
be applied to Afghanistan, as they were one of the principal signatories to
it. This convention not only reiterates support for the previous
conventions mentioned here, but for numerous others as well. This
convention uses all previous international treaties regarding terrorism as
precedence, and then builds on them.Furthermore, this Convention does
not call for the application of Islamic law over Anglo-Saxon law. Since
the OIC Convention does not conflict with international law conventions
previously established by the United Nations, Afghanistan is further bound
to this convention (Organization of the Islamic Conference 1997: NP).

The primary responsibility of the UN Security Council is to maintain
international peace and security. Under Article 24, the Security Council
has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security. The Security Council used their powers under this Article, as
well as Article 24, to pass resolution 1267 calling for sanctions against
the Taliban. Bringing Usamah Bin Laden to trial for his actions was a
means by which the United Nations Security Council took measures by which
to ensure security (United Nations Security Council 1998-1999:NP).

The call by the Security Council to bring Usamah Bin Laden to justice
does have its merits, and is legally justified under current international
law. Bin Laden has been implicated in acts of terrorism all over the
world, and his financial backing, while weakening, is still considerable.

By getting Afghanistan to turn Bin Laden over to the proper authorities, a
measure of peace and security can be attained once again. By bringing him
to trial, these prevailing instruments of international law that apply to
terrorism can be viewed in force.

After reviewing the special session of the International Court of
Justice, held on December 1, 1999, my opinion regarding the legality of
imposing sanctions against the Taliban changed. After reviewing the merits
of this action and what other steps should have been taken, I now find
myself in the unusual position of completely changing my view on this
issue. During review, four main questions became apparent.

The first question is whether all other options were considered and
attempted before imposing sanctions. This first question is one of
paramount importance. Unless all other steps had been taken, the Security
Council would have jumped the gun and moved too soon to impose sanctions.

While there was scattered evidence indicating that there had indeed been
some sort of discussion between the U.S. government and the Taliban
regarding a deal for bringing Bin Laden to trial, nothing was certain. All
evidence pointing to this fact also pointed to the fact that neither side
had tried too hard. Further complicating matters is the fact that there
was an insufficient amount of information from any of the members of the
panel that clearly proved whether or not all other measures had first been
taken. Article 33 of the UN Charter was used repeatedly to illustrate the
need for these other steps to be taken first (United Nations Security
Council 1998-1999: NP).

Personally, I felt that while Article 33 did call for this, Article
41, which gives the Security Council authority to step in after determining
that a threat to peace exists under Article 39 of the Charter, authorizes
the Security Council to use any measures short of military force,
“including the complete or partial interruption of economic relations” (UN
Charter, Article 41). I find it difficult to conclude whether or not other
all options had been considered because of a lack of sufficient evidence,
which would enable one to review whether or not all options had been
attempted prior to imposing sanctions.

The second question is to determine who has jurisdiction over Bin
Laden. This question was also interesting in that it called into question
who should be responsible for trying Bin Laden if he is brought up for
trial. Since the bombings in question took place in Kenya and Tanzania,
the committee thought that they would have had first opportunity to try
him. However, the fact that these bombings took place at United States
Embassies meant that the US also had jurisdiction. This fact, although
unimportant in the end, was largely ignored after brought up briefly in the
beginning of the session. Another question affecting the jurisdiction
issue was the question of whether or not the Taliban was the de facto
government of Afghanistan. The fact that the Afghanistan representatives
were not from the Taliban clouded this issue amidst questions of command,
control, and recognition (United Nations Security Council 1998-1999:NP).

This question was ultimately split, as the voting members of the
committee (Kenya/Tanzania, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan excluded) could not
reach consensus on whether the Taliban or the United States should have
jurisdiction in this case. The Taliban had apparently made overtures to
United States officials regarding a deal, but the US refusal to come to
terms left questions (United Nations Security Council 1998-1999:NP). The
answer to this question was ultimately determined with the next question.

The third question to answer is whether Usamah Bin Laden should be
extradited. The question of whether Usamah Bin Laden should be extradited
was yet another point of contention. Since the Taliban was receiving
little or no cooperation from other nations in terms of gathering evidence
from which to begin court proceedings, it was determined that the Taliban
should not be forced to extradite him at the present time. However, the
members of the committee were quick to point out that while Bin Laden
should not be extradited at this time, measures should be taken to
extradite him if the Taliban fails to begin court proceedings within a
“reasonable” timeframe of undetermined duration (United Nations Security
Council 1998-1999:NP). This question took into account the previous two
questions, which when combined led to the final question of this paper.

The final question raised is whether the decision to impose sanctions
on the Taliban was legal. The question at hand is the one the
International Court of Justice Special Advisory Committee was asked to
answer. Whether or not this action was legal under international law could
mean the difference between success and failure in terms of finding a way
to bring Usamah Bin Laden to trial for these bombings. The committee
decided by a 5-1 margin that the sanctions were not legal under
international law (United Nations Security Council 1998-1999:NP). I felt
that the committee had made the proper decision given the available
information with a few exceptions.

The committee, prodded by the Justice from Afghanistan, considered
Article 33, which clearly defines the need for alternative resolutions to
first be undertaken, to be above and beyond anything outlined elsewhere in
the Charter. This meant that the question was only considered from the one
perspective.Additionally, the fact that there is no clear information
regarding whether or not Kenya and Tanzania had given up their right to try
Bin Laden left the committee with questions regarding who had jurisdiction
over the case if it was ever brought forth. Finally, the fact that most of
the justices agreed that there was insufficient information to determine
whether all other measures were taken first was troublesome. I felt that
without sufficient information either confirming or denying that other
steps has previously been taken, the decision to rule on the question at
all would set a dangerous precedent if carried out in the real
international Court of Justice. Therefore, I felt that any decision should
have been made only after information was found clearly outlining what
measures had and had not been taken by the United States and the Taliban in
resolving this dispute.

In conclusion, I felt that while the ICJ members did an exceptional
job in disseminating information and utilizing international law to make a
determination regarding the legality of imposing sanctions, there should
have been more information available to make this determination. In most
legal systems, attempts are made to obtain all available evidence before
making judicial decisions, and I believe that more information was needed,
because I still have numerous questions regarding this issue on the whole.

This case is certainly only one example of the difficulties with an
international court. But, these obstacles should not be used as a reason
to dismiss the court’s actions nor the logic for the court’s existence.

These obstacles should be used as motivating factors for strengthening,
improving, and expanding the international court system. Additionally,
until the international community bears prosperity and peace for all,
terrorism will always remain considerable threat to the United States and
its’ national security.

And, because of these threats to security and the very nature of
terrorism, the United States has a counter-terrorism policy that consists
of three parts. First, the US will make no concession to terrorists and
strike no deals. If the US were to give in to terrorists’ demands, it
would inspire every other terrorist to commit violent crimes. An example of
this plan is the hostage situation in Peru, where 72 hostages were taken
and four months later a successful rescue took place. The second US policy
states that all terrorists will be held accountable for their crimes in a
court of law. In recent years many international terrorists have been
convicted and sent to prison. The third, and most important policy is to
isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorism and
force them to change their behavior. UN sanctions and the use of military
force are now actively used to force host countries to change their views
on terrorism (1997 Global Terrorism: NP).

Radical Islamic terrorist organizations have the ability and desire to
threaten the United States. Sanctions and diplomatic bargaining will not
solve the problem of Islamic terrorism, yet military force will only make
the problem worse. There will be no resolution to this problem in the near
future, meanwhile the gap between the Western world and the Arab nations
will continue to grow. Constant monitoring, careful planning, and the
preservation of the International Court of Justice are our only means of
prevention, or deterrence, against terrorism.


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